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Introduction.We studied whether primary care teams respond to financial group bonuses by improving the recording of diagnoses,
whether this intervention leads to diagnoses reflecting the anticipated distribution of diseases, and how the recording of a significant
chronic disease, diabetes, alters after the application of these bonuses. Methods. We performed an observational register-based
retrospective quasi-experimental follow-up study with before-and-after setting and two control groups in primary healthcare of
a Finnish town. We studied the rate of recorded diagnoses in visits to general practitioners with interrupted time series analysis.
The distribution of these diagnoses was also recorded. Results. After group bonuses, the rate of recording diagnoses increased by
17.9% (95% CI: 13.6–22.3) but not in either of the controls (−2.0 to −0.3%). The increase in the rate of recorded diagnoses in the
care teams varied between 14.9% (4.7–25.2) and 33.7% (26.6–41.3).The distribution of recorded diagnoses resembled the respective
distribution of diagnoses in the former studies of diagnoses made in primary care. The rate of recorded diagnoses of diabetes did
not increase just after the intervention. Conclusions. In primary care, the completeness of diagnosis recording can be, to varying
degrees, influenced by group bonuses without guarantee that recording of clinically significant chronic diseases is improved.
1. Introduction
Financial incentives can be defined as “all the rewards agents
(physicians or the physician organization) receive conditional
on their measured (explicitly or implicitly) performance or
behavior” [1]. The system by which physicians are paid may
affect their professional practice and decision-making [2, 3].
Therefore, differently tailored payment systems for general
practitioners (GPs) have been used to achieve the desired pol-
icy objectives, such as improving the quality of care or recruit-
ment to underserved areas [2, 3]. There is ample recent re-
search about how pay-for-performance systems to GPs alter
their clinical activities [4–10].They can also be used to reduce
inequalities in the delivery of clinical care related to area
deprivation [4].There are quite autonomous actors other than
physicians, such as nurses who specialize in the treatment of
diabetes [11–14], who may influence the clinical practice of
their organization dramatically and even improve the quality
of care [11, 14]. Therefore, disciplines other than GPs might
well be considered as targets for financial incentives.
Insufficient recording of diagnoses may hamper planning
of healthcare and adequate allocation and management of
resources [15] and improving the recording of chronic dis-
eases might theoretically serve as one of the first targets in
improving the quality of care [15, 16]. Therefore, the admin-
istration of the primary healthcare of Espoo City considered
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the recording of diagnoses in only 40–60% of doctor visits
to be insufficient [17]. Former studies suggested that financial
incentives to GPs increased the recording of diagnoses [5, 7]
and a preliminary analysis suggested that group bonuses
could do the same [17]. With financial group bonuses to care
teams, the administration of Espoo primary care wanted to
improve the recording of diagnoses, especially the recording
of diabetes diagnoses. Diabetes is known to require consider-
able care and causes a lot of costs [16, 18–20].
The main aim of this present study was to quantify the
extent of the effect of group bonuses on improvement in the
level of marking diagnoses in the patient chart system. We
examined whether all teams responded equally to this inter-
vention. The administration was also concerned about the
adequacy of the marked diagnoses because any diagnosis re-
cording, even inadequate, produced financial rewards.There-
fore, we investigated the range of diagnoses which were
recorded to find out whether the present financial interven-
tion produced data which reflected the distribution of diag-
noses in real clinical life in primary care and thus provided
valid data about public health. As an example of a significant
chronic public disease, the recording of diabetes [16, 18–20]
was monitored to find out whether this disease was recorded
more frequently after the present intervention. Toprovide im-
pression about costs group bonus incurred for Espoo primary
care, the percentage of staff receiving bonuses was recorded,
as well as the mean bonus per year for one staff member.
2. Methods
2.1. Design and Setting. Thepresent research is a retrospective
longitudinal quasi-experimental study with a before-and-
after design in 5 primary healthcare areas, with 3–6 care teams
(cells) each, in Espoo (230,000 and 254,000 inhabitants in
2006 and 2012, resp.). Altogether, the number of cells was
23. There were 6–8 doctors and 6–8 nurses in each cell. The
precise number of doctors and nurses varied slightly over the
study period. More detailed information about the functions
and frequency of use in Espoo primary care at the time of this
study was described previously [17].
No ethical approval was required because this study was
made directly on a computer from the patient registerwithout
identifying the patients (https://rekisteritutkimus.wordpress
.com/luvat-ja-tietosuoja/).The register keeper (the health au-
thorities of Espoo and Vantaa, 23.8.2016) granted permission
to carry out the study. The report generator automatically
allowed following themonthly number of recorded diagnoses
for each individual doctor and therefore also by each individ-
ual cell.
As control data, we had the respective data on the record-
ing of monthly diagnoses from two different primary care
units where there was a similar cell structure but no team
incentives were applied. Dental primary care of Espoo was
chosen because both somatic and dental primary care are
under the same administration, andwewanted to seewhether
desired practices disperse to other parts of the same primary
care system without actual intervention. The primary care of
Vantaa city was chosen because it resembles Espoo in its loca-
tion and number of inhabitants (about 200,000 inhabitants,
located neighboring Helsinki, the capital of Finland).
2.2. Intervention. The chosen intervention to increase the
number of recordeddiagnoseswas to pay bonuses to allmem-
bers of the care teams who met their target. The administra-
tion of Espoo primary care defined the focus areas and their
goal levels at the start of 2005 and improvement in recorded
diagnoses on the patient charts was chosen as the main goal.
Before 1.3.2005, no group bonuses to the cells were delivered.
To commit the staff to the change in function, a multidisci-
plinary team contract was signed with the members of the
cells. The contract defined the rules and approaches to the
functions of the cells.The team contracts were signed by all of
the five service areas for the period 1.3.2005–30.5.2005, which
was considered to be the time of the start of the intervention.
After signing this contract, the cells were able to aim for group
bonuses. This meant that, to get a group bonus, a care team
had to take care that diagnoses were recorded in more than
75% of all doctor visits of that team.
2.3. Primary and Secondary Outcomes. The proportion of
monthly doctor visits having recorded diagnoses was selected
as the main measure to study the effect of implementing
group bonuses. Diagnoses were recorded with the ICD-10
system by the doctors.
To study the effects of group bonuses at the individual
cell level, the team-based monthly percentage of visits having
marked diagnoses was derived from electrical patient charts
from each care team in Espoo primary care. We calculated
themonthly variation of these percentages in each cell during
the year 2006 when the intervention was already fully func-
tioning.The variation between care teams was analyzed using
these aggregated cell-level percentages. To establish whether
the team incentive system had altered the recording of diag-
noses of chronic diseases, the monthly numbers of diabetes
diagnoses (ICD-10 codes E10 and E11) were also studied in
Espoo health center. Simultaneously, all diagnoses recorded
during 2006 were also gathered.
The costs of group bonuseswere obtained fromyears 2005
and 2006 from the payroll system of the social and health
bureau of Espoo. The percentage of staff receiving bonuses
and annual bonus per staff member were recorded.
2.4. Data Extraction. The effect of the intervention on the
proportion of monthly doctor visits with recorded diagnoses
was continuously monitored for a two-year time period
before intervention and 1.5 years after it. The data about the
recorded diagnoses was specifically derived from the elec-
tronic Effica patient chart system (Tieto Ltd., Helsinki, Fin-
land) from which the data were reliably obtainable from
1.5.2003. The control data from Espoo dental care were simi-
larly obtainable from 1.5.2003. The control data from Vantaa
health center were obtained from the graphic Finstar patient
chart system (Logica Ltd., Helsinki, Finland). The Effica and
Finstar patient chart systems have a similar setting in the site
where the diagnosis is supposed to be marked. Writing the
three first symbols (letters when using directly a diagnosis or
a letter and twonumberswhenusing directly an ICD-10 code)
opens automatically a list of all putative diagnoses with that
symbol combination. Then, the GP or dentist can choose by
double-clicking the desired diagnosis from these options.
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Figure 1: Effect of group bonus on the percentage of total amounts
of visits to doctors with recorded diagnoses in Espoo primary care
and controls. Follow-up time is May 2003 to Dec 2006.
2.5. Statistical Analysis. To study the effect of intervention
on the frequency of marking diagnoses in GP visits, we used
interrupted time series (ITS) ARIMA model [21] to compare
the percentages of monthly doctor visits with recorded diag-
noses before and after intervention. The same testing meth-
ods were used when these proportions were compared with
the control units (Espoo dental healthcare and Vantaa pri-
mary care).
The variations between care teams in Espoo primary care
were analyzed using the aggregated cell-level percentages in
2006 and performing One-Way Repeated Measures- (RM-)
ANOVAon rankswith suitable corrections (Tukey) formulti-
ple comparisons or when following the development of an
individual care team as a function of time.
To study whether the team incentive system altered the
recording of diagnoses of chronic diseases, themonthly num-
ber of diabetes diagnoses (ICD-10 codes E10.∗∗ and E11.∗∗)
was also analyzedwithOne-WayRepeatedMeasures Analysis
of Variance followed by Bonferroni correction for multiple
comparisons.
3. Results
Based on the ITS analyses, the proportion of recorded
diagnoses in Espoo primary care increased on average by
17.9% units (95% CI: 13.6–22.3; 𝑃 < 0.001, ITS analysis) from
59–70% up to 90% after applying group bonuses, while there
was no increase in the controls (Vantaa primary care −2.0%
[−4.1–0.1] and Espoo dental care −0.3% [−1–0.4]; see Fig-
ure 1).
During intervention in 2006, there was still considerable
variation (Figure 2(a)) between different cells of Espoo health
center in the recording of diagnoses during monthly doctor
visits (𝑃 < 0.001, Figure 2(a)). Despite this difference in the
level of recorded diagnoses, all the cells improved their per-
formance after intervention, and in themost active cell, Cell 1,
this improvement was 33.7% (26.6–41.3; 𝑃 < 0.001, ITS anal-
ysis), while in the least active unit, Cell 11, it was less than half
of that (14.9% [4.7–25.2; 𝑃 = 0.007], Figure 2(b)).
Altogether, 2,984 different ICD-10 diagnoses were as-
sessed during the year 2006 by Espoo GPs. The total num-
ber of assessed diagnoses was 73,912. The distribution of the
most used diagnoses in 2006 is described in Table 1. Most of
the visits concerned mild respiratory infections, elevated
blood pressure, low back pain, type II diabetes, and infectious
gastroenteritis. The median rate of monthly doctor visits,
in which diabetes diagnoses were recorded, doubled after
intervention (𝑃 < 0.001, RM-ANOVA, median: 208; IQR:
96.8) in 2006 when compared with preceding years (2003
[108; 71.5], 2004 [117; 29.5], or 2005 [134; 35]). According to
ITS analysis, there was, however, no statistically significant
intervention effect (1% [95% CI: −2.3–4.2]; Figure 3). During
the same follow-up period, the number of all monthly doctor
visits varied between 21,506 (95% CI: 20,072–22,941 in 2004)
and 22,243 (20,657–23,827 in 2005) visits (𝑃 = 0.24, RM-
ANOVA).
The annual bonus per staff member proved to be about
700 euros (Table 2).Thepercentage of staff reaching the group
bonus was about 50% of the total staff.
4. Discussion
Multidisciplinary rewarding with financial incentives, for
example, group bonus with team contracts, improved the rate
of marking of diagnoses in the patient charts by about 18%.
This improvement was not, however, observed with a chronic
disease diagnosis, diabetes. There were still considerable
variations between the cells in the levels of recording the
diagnoses after applying group bonuses. All obtained diag-
noses accurately reflected the anticipated distribution of dis-
eases in Finnish primary care.
In accordance with the present findings regarding group
bonuses, former studies suggested that financial incentives
to GPs increased the recording of diagnoses and thereby the
recording of diseases [5, 7]. Various and numerous admin-
istrational factors and management problems [17] were sup-
posed to create hindrances to the proper recording of patient
data, but group bonuses seemed to overcome their effects.The
present data and some recent studies [6, 22, 23] suggest that
financial incentives may be used to alter the behavior of GPs
towards improving the quality of care. At least some aspects of
quality, for example, indirect indicators of the quality of care,
may show an improvement with pay-for-performance sys-
temswhile patient outcomesmay not necessarily do so [6, 10].
Taken together with the former results, our data support the
view that financial incentives clearly modify system centered
indicators of quality of care [24–26].
The present intervention was aimed at ensuring that
the diagnoses were marked for projects directed towards
improving the management of chronic illnesses in Espoo
primary care [17]. Group bonuses were not, however, nec-
essarily the cause of the observed increase in the recording
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Figure 2: (a) Comparison of monthly percentages of visits to GPs with recorded diagnoses between different units of Espoo primary care
during the year 2006. Median and 25% and 75% quartiles are presented with a box plot, 10 and 90% limits are presented with brackets, and the
lowest and highest values are presented with dots. (b) Effect of group bonus on the percentage of total amounts of visits to GPs with recorded
diagnoses in Cells 1 and 11. Follow-up time is May 2003 to Dec 2006.
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Figure 3: Effect of group bonus on monthly numbers of recorded
diabetes diagnoses in visits to GPs. Follow-up time is May 2003 to
Dec 2006.
of an important public health problem, namely, diabetes. An
alternative explanation is that group bonuses were effective in
increasing the recording of diabetes but that these diagnoses
occurred so seldom and the change was so slow that ITS
analysis failed to detect it. Nevertheless, it is not confirmed
whether group bonuses are effective primers in primary care
interventions which are directed towards chronic public dis-
eases.
We cannot answer the question of why group bonuses
were more effective in enhancing the recording of diagnoses
in some teams and less effective in others with the present
data. Roughly 60 euros extra per month is a considerable
addition to salary for othermembers of the team thanGPs. To
offset “free riders” and to avoid dilution of the incentive, the
teams must be relatively small [27], which fitted well with the
present care teams of 16 persons or less. This relatively small
size of the care teams (e.g., cells) could have created group
pressuremotivating the whole team to improve performance.
Money is an essential factor, but other mechanisms, such as
group pressure, may play a role in financial incentive-based
interventions. To support this, partial withdrawal of financial
incentives did not lead to a deterioration of results obtained
with a GP-based pay-for-performance intervention [9] and
the mean team-based rate of recording diagnoses decreased
only a little after total withdrawal of group bonuses [17].
In the present study, most of the visits (Table 1) concerned
mild respiratory infections, elevated blood pressure, low back
pain, and type II diabetes.Therewas no extra education in the
intervention group for better registration of the diagnoses.
Pa¨rna¨nen et al. [28] reported that upper respiratory infections
and otitis media, hypertension, musculoskeletal pains, and
diabeteswere themost common reasons tovisit aGPin a Finn-
ish health center. In Denmark, the most common reasons to
visit a GP were reported to be musculoskeletal, respiratory,
BioMed Research International 5
Table 1: The distribution of the most used diagnoses in primary care doctor visits in 2006.
ICD-10 Diagnosis Number of patients %
J06.9 Acute upper respiratory airway infection, nonspecific 9680 13,1
I10 Primary hypertension 2708 3,7
M54.5 Low back pain 2202 3
J01.0 Acute maxillary sinusitis 2061 2,8
E11 Diabetes, type II 1686 2,3
A09 Diarrhea and gastroenteritis, presumed infectious origin 1290 1,7
H66.9 Acute otitis media, nonspecific 1195 1,6
J20.9 Acute bronchitis, nonspecific 1184 1,6
M54 Back pain 988 1,3
G44.2 Tension headache 940 1,3
H66.0 Acute otitis media, purulent 854 1,2
M54.4 Low back pain with sciatica 647 0,9
S93.4 Ankle sprain 584 0,8
H10.3 Acute conjunctivitis, nonspecific 565 0,8
J03.9 Acute tonsillitis, nonspecific 540 0,7
N30.0 Acute cystitis 532 0,7
H10.0 Conjunctivitis, purulent 514 0,7
R10.4 Abdominal pain, nonspecific 512 0,7
H65.0 Acute otitis media, serous 500 0,7
J04.0 Acute laryngitis 487 0,7
J02.9 Acute pharyngitis, nonspecific 466 0,6
E78.01 Hypercholesterolaemia, primary 452 0,6
F43.0 Acute stress reaction 394 0,5
R10.3 Lower abdominal pain 388 0,5
M77.1 Lateral epicondylitis 383 0,5
I48 Atrial fibrillation 379 0,5
F32.9 Depression, nonspecific 370 0,5
J45 Bronchial asthma 367 0,5
I25.1 Coronary artery disease 352 0,5
R50.9 Fever, nonspecific 345 0,5
M75.1 Rotator cuff syndrome 338 0,5
J01.9 Acute sinusitis, nonspecific 319 0,4
F32 Depression 304 0,4
R53 Fatigue 291 0,4
E10 Diabetes, type I 289 0,4
F51.0 Insomnia, nonorganic 277 0,4
M53.0 Cervicocranial syndrome 272 0,4
R05 Cough 271 0,4
R51.80 Sleep disorder, specific nonorganic 264 0,4
Table 2: Percentage of staff receiving group bonus, number of staff, and mean size of bonus in 2005 and 2006.
Health service areas Percentage of staff receiving bonus Mean annual bonus/person (€)
2005 2006 2005 2006
Area 1 44,0 50,0 601,77 716,85
Area 2 16,0 49,0 205,15 670,97
Area 3 36,0 49,0 528,77 762,57
Area 4 26,0 41,5 347,85 592,45
Area 5 36,0 55,7 502,21 768,75
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and skin related diagnoses followed by psychological, circula-
tory, andmetabolic disorderswhen the ICPC systemwas used
[29].Thus, the diagnoses recorded due to the present financial
interventionwouldmost likely seem to reflect real clinical life
in Finnish primary care and the present intervention may
provide reliable data about public health.
The main strength of the present study was the com-
pleteness of the data. The computerized patient chart system
reached every single doctor in the public primary care in
Espoo and Vantaa and every public primary care dentist in
Espoo. The accuracy of all the diagnoses cannot be guaran-
teed in the present experiment. There are differences in how
individual GPs code their diagnoses. However, the data were
so large that differences in coding between different GPs are
likely to vanish in random deviation.
5. Limitations
The present study does not provide clear information about
whether group bonuses are applicable in other parts of health-
care. Neither does it give new answers to the key question
of whether the use of these financial incentives can improve
directmeasures in public health or patient centered indicators
of care in primary care. Qualitative studies or comparing
group bonuses with other types of incentive-based interven-
tions should be performed to gain information about how
group incentives work and why there is so much variability
in the effect of group bonuses.
Group bonus may alter the behavior of primary care
teams. However, it is not necessarily an effective intervention
for the treatment of chronic diseases and its efficacy in care
teams is not very constant. The administration of healthcare
must carefully consider which behavior is rewarded before
intervening in clinical activity with group bonuses.
6. Conclusion
Group bonuses improve the completeness of diagnosis cod-
ing in primary care but the variability of this effect on the
different primary care groups is substantial. They do not
guarantee better recording of chronic diseases. All obtained
diagnoses accurately reflected the anticipated distribution of
diseases.
Abbreviations
GP: General practitioner
ITS: Interrupted time series.
Conflicts of Interest
The authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest.
Acknowledgments
Theauthorswould like to thank the cities of Espoo andVantaa
for giving them the chance to perform this study.They would
also like to thankMichael Horwood, Ph.D., for reviewing the
language.
References
[1] R. L. Kane, P. E. Johnson, R. J. Town, and M. Butler, “A struc-
tured review of the effect of economic incentives on consumers’
preventive behavior,” American Journal of Preventive Medicine,
vol. 27, no. 4, pp. 327–352, 2004.
[2] A. Giuffrida, T. Gosden, F. Forland et al., “Target payments in
primary care: effects on professional practice and health care
outcomes,” Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews (Online),
vol. 3, article CD000531, 2000.
[3] T. Gosden, F. Forland, I. S. Kristiansen et al., “Capitation, salary,
fee-for-service and mixed systems of payment: effects on the
behaviour of primary care physicians,” Cochrane Database of
Systematic Reviews (Online), vol. 3, article CD002215, 2000.
[4] T. Doran, C. Fullwood, E. Kontopantelis, and D. Reeves, “Effect
of financial incentives on inequalities in the delivery of primary
clinical care in England: analysis of clinical activity indicators
for the quality and outcomes framework,” The Lancet, vol. 372,
no. 9640, pp. 728–736, 2008.
[5] T. Doran, E. Kontopantelis, J. M. Valderas et al., “Effect of finan-
cial incentives on incentivised and non-incentivised clinical
activities: longitudinal analysis of data from theUKQuality and
Outcomes Framework,” BMJ, vol. 342, no. jun28 1, pp. d3590–
d3590, 2011.
[6] E. Kontopantelis, D. Reeves, J. M. Valderas, S. Campbell, and
T. Doran, “Recorded quality of primary care for patients with
diabetes in England before and after the introduction of a
financial incentive scheme: A longitudinal observational study,”
BMJ Quality & Safety, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 53–64, 2013.
[7] K. McLintock, A. M. Russell, S. L. Alderson et al., “The effects
of financial incentives for case finding for depression in patients
with diabetes and coronary heart disease: Interrupted time
series analysis,”BMJOpen, vol. 4, no. 8, Article ID e005178, 2014.
[8] M. J. Harrison, M. Dusheiko, M. Sutton, H. Gravelle, T. Doran,
and M. Roland, “Effect of a national primary care pay for
performance scheme on emergency hospital admissions for
ambulatory care sensitive conditions: Controlled longitudinal
study,” BMJ, vol. 349, Article ID g6423, 2014.
[9] E. Kontopantelis, D. Springate, D. Reeves, D. M. Ashcroft, J. M.
Valderas, and T. Doran, “Withdrawing performance indicators:
Retrospective analysis of general practice performance under
UK Quality and Outcomes Framework,” BMJ, vol. 348, article
no. g330, 2014.
[10] E. Kontopantelis, D. A. Springate,M.Ashworth, R. T.Webb, I. E.
Buchan, and T. Doran, “Investigating the relationship between
quality of primary care and premature mortality in England: A
spatial whole-population study,” BMJ, vol. 350, article no. h904,
2015.
[11] M. Weinberger, M. S. Kirkman, G. P. Saa et al., “A nurse-coor-
dinated intervention for primary care patients with non-insu-
lin-dependent diabetes mellitus: Impact on glycemic control
and health-related quality of life,” Journal of General Internal
Medicine, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 59–66, 1995.
[12] M. O. Mundinger, R. L. Kane, E. R. Lenz et al., “Primary care
outcomes in patients treated by nurse practitioners or physi-
cians: a randomized trial,”The Journal of the American Medical
Association, vol. 283, no. 1, pp. 59–68, 2000.
[13] S. T. Houweling, N. Kleefstra, K. J. J. Van Hateren, K. H. Groe-
nier, B.Meyboom-de Jong, andH. J. G. Bilo, “Can diabetesman-
agement be safely transferred to practice nurses in a primary
care setting? A randomised controlled trial,” Journal of Clini-
cal Nursing, vol. 20, no. 9-10, pp. 1264–1272, 2011.
BioMed Research International 7
[14] K. D. Coburn, S. Marcantonio, R. Lazansky, M. Keller, and N.
Davis, “Effect of a community-based nursing intervention on
mortality in chronically ill older adults: A randomized con-
trolled trial,” PLoS Medicine, vol. 9, no. 7, Article ID e1001265,
2012.
[15] D. Fleming, F. Schellevis, and W. Paget, “Health monitoring in
sentinel practice networks: the contribution of primary care,”
European Journal of Public Health, vol. 13, supplement 3, pp. 80–
84, 2003.
[16] P. Hjerpe, J. Merlo, H. Ohlsson, K. Bengtsson Bostro¨m, and
U. Lindblad, “Validity of registration of ICD codes and pre-
scriptions in a research database in Swedish primary care: a
cross-sectional study in Skaraborg primary care database,”BMC
Medical Informatics and Decision Making, vol. 10, no. 1, article
23, 2010.
[17] T. Lehtovuori, T. Kauppila, J. Kallio,M. Raina, L. Suominen, and
A. M. Heikkinen, “Financial team incentives improved record-
ing of diagnoses in primary care: a quasi-experimental longitu-
dinal follow-up study with controls,” BMC Research Notes, vol.
8, no. 1, article 668, 2015.
[18] A. N. Goudswaard, K. Lam, R. P. Stolk, and G. E. H. M. Rutten,
“Quality of recording of data from patients with type 2 diabetes
is not a valid indicator of quality of care. A cross-sectional
study,” Journal of Family Practice, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 173–177, 2003.
[19] T. Valle, V. A. Koivisto, A. Reunanen, T. Kangas, and A. Ris-
sanen, “Glycemic control in patients with diabetes in Finland,”
Diabetes Care, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 575–579, 1999.
[20] E. Ketola, R. Sipila¨, M. Ma¨kela¨, and M. Klockars, “Quality im-
provement programme for cardiovascular disease risk factor re-
cording in primary care,” Quality & Safety in Health Care, vol.
9, no. 3, pp. 175–180, 2000.
[21] Effective Practice and Organisation of Care (EPOC), “Inter-
rupted time series (ITS) analyses,” EPOC Resources for review
authors.Oslo:NorwegianKnowledgeCentre for theHealth Ser-
vices;http://epoc.cochrane.org/epoc-specific-resources-review-
authors, 2013.
[22] M. B. Rosenthal, R. G. Frank, Z. Li, and A. M. Epstein, “Early
experience with pay-for-performance: From concept to prac-
tice,” Journal of the American Medical Association, vol. 294, no.
14, pp. 1788–1793, 2005.
[23] K. Kirschner, J. Braspenning, J. E. A. Jacobs, and R. Grol, “De-
sign choices made by target users for a pay-for-performance
program in primary care: An action research approach,” BMC
Family Practice, vol. 13, article no. 25, pp. 161–171, 2012.
[24] S. M. Campbell, D. Reeves, E. Kontopantelis, B. Sibbald, andM.
Roland, “Effects of pay for performance on the quality of pri-
mary care in England,” The New England Journal of Medicine,
vol. 361, no. 4, pp. 368–378, 2009.
[25] A. Scott, P. Sivey, D. Ait Ouakrim et al., “The effect of financial
incentives on the quality of health care provided by primary
care physicians,” Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, no.
9, Article ID CD008451, 2011.
[26] B. Yuan, L. He, Q. Meng, and L. Jia, “Payment methods for out-
patient care facilities,”CochraneDatabase of Systematic Reviews,
vol. 2017, no. 3, Article ID CD011153, 2017.
[27] D. B. Balkin and E. F. Montemayor, “Explaining Team-Based
Pay: A Contingency Perspective Based on the Organizational
Life Cycle, Team Design, and Organizational Learning Litera-
tures,” Human Resource Management Review, vol. 10, no. 3, pp.
249–269, 2000.
[28] H. Pa¨rna¨nen, E. Kumpusalo, and J. Takala, “Primary health care
ICD -A tool for general practice research,” International Journal
of Health Planning and Management, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 133–148,
2000.
[29] G. Moth, F. Olesen, and P. Vedsted, “Reasons for encounter and
disease patterns in Danish primary care: changes over 16 years,”
Scandinavian Journal of Primary Health Care, vol. 30, no. 2, pp.
70–75, 2012.
Stem Cells 
International
Hindawi
www.hindawi.com Volume 2018
Hindawi
www.hindawi.com Volume 2018
MEDIATORS
INFLAMMATION
of
Endocrinology
International Journal of
Hindawi
www.hindawi.com Volume 2018
Hindawi
www.hindawi.com Volume 2018
Disease Markers
Hindawi
www.hindawi.com Volume 2018
BioMed 
Research International
Oncology
Journal of
Hindawi
www.hindawi.com Volume 2013
Hindawi
www.hindawi.com Volume 2018
Oxidative Medicine and 
Cellular Longevity
Hindawi
www.hindawi.com Volume 2018
PPAR Research
Hindawi Publishing Corporation 
http://www.hindawi.com Volume 2013www.hindawi.com
The Scientific 
World Journal
8
Immunology Research
Hindawi
www.hindawi.com Volume 2018
Journal of
Obesity
Journal of
Hindawi
www.hindawi.com Volume 2018
Hindawi
www.hindawi.com Volume 2018
 Computational and  
Mathematical Methods 
in Medicine
Hindawi
www.hindawi.com Volume 2018
Behavioural 
Neurology
Ophthalmology
Journal of
Hindawi
www.hindawi.com Volume 2018
Diabetes Research
Journal of
Hindawi
www.hindawi.com Volume 2018
Hindawi
www.hindawi.com Volume 2018
Research and Treatment
AIDS
Hindawi
www.hindawi.com Volume 2018
Gastroenterology 
Research and Practice
Hindawi
www.hindawi.com Volume 2018
Parkinson’s 
Disease
Evidence-Based 
Complementary and
Alternative Medicine
Volume 2018
Hindawi
www.hindawi.com
Submit your manuscripts at
www.hindawi.com
